



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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November 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Session on
the Republic of China (2), November 25, 1969

DISTRIBUTION:

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S/S
EA - Ambassador Green
- Ambassador McConaughy
- Ambassador Brown
- Mr. Moore
EA/ROC - Mr. Shoesmith
EA/ACA - Mr. Kreisberg
L - Mr. Stevenson
L/EA - Mr. Futterman
PM - Mr. Spiers
PM/JW - Mr. Wolf
S/PC - Mr. Cargo
- Mr. Seligmann
H - Ambassador Torbert
WH - Mr. Ehrlichman
- Mr. Mollenhoff
NSC - Mr. Lehman
DOD - Mr. French
- Mr. Knaur
CIA - Mr.
NSA - Mr.

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State Dept. review completed

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Senators Symington, Javits, Sparkman, Fulbright, and Aiken were present during the morning session and Senators Symington and Fulbright in the afternoon.

Pending receipt of the letter promised from the Department of State in regard to testimony on intelligence matters, Counsel proceeded with questions in regard to military exercises. He questioned Admiral Chew closely in an unsuccessful effort to show that US forces participated in joint exercises with ROC forces involving operations appropriate to a mainland invasion. Admiral Chew noted, however, that all exercises were of a defensive nature and that the involvement of landing craft, for example, was appropriate for a counter-landing in the event of an invasion of Taiwan. He also said he was unaware of any ROC publicity intended to portray the exercises in other than a defensive light.

Colonel Tweedy declined to answer questions about the circumstances in which US aircraft would engage Chinese aircraft in the Taiwan Strait on the ground that this was contingency planning, and Senator Symington accepted his explanation. Counsel asked to have supplied for the record the reason why the Chinese Nationalists could not provide strip-alert aircraft instead of US forces.

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Admiral Chew and Colonel Tweedy, at the request of Counsel, summarized those portions of the written statement dealing with US forces and missions. Senator Symington asked whether the ROC could defend itself if the US supplied equipment only, but refrained from joint defense-planning. Admiral Chew said a sustained defense would not be possible without naval and air support. When the Chairman asked why we did not turn over the Taiwan Strait patrol to the "Taiwanese," the Ambassador noted that the ROC has its own patrol.

Senator Symington interrupted the proceedings upon delivery of Mr. Stevenson's letter informing the Senator of the reasons why it was desirable to have intelligence matters testified to by the heads of intelligence agencies with special security precautions. He read the letter into the record, and then passed it to Senator Fulbright. The latter said it was not satisfactory: ambassadors represented all government operations and past experience indicated that Mr. Helms, when he appeared at hearings, did not testify about the political impact of his agency's activities. Senator Fulbright regarded the Department's position as an unprecedented device to protect ambassadors from answering,

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administration. He remarked that perhaps the thing to do was not to confirm any more ambassadors, since the conduct of foreign relations had been turned over to CIA and the military.

Senator Symington endorsed Senator Fulbright's position that the letter was a trap, and then polled Senators Aiken and Javits, who supported their colleagues. Senator Aiken said he had declared publicly that the Department of State was 4-F thirty years ago and believed it was necessary to restore the Department of State to its proper role as the coordinator of all foreign policy. Senator Javits remarked that he found an anomaly in the Department of State's willingness to share information with foreign governments, but not with the Senate, and said it was "time to fight it out." Senator Symington said that the administration was headed for a direct confrontation between the executive and legislative branches.

Senator Fulbright thereupon suggested that the proceedings continue while an effort was made to get the Secretary of State to appear before the Subcommittee in the afternoon. Acting on this suggestion, Senator Symington requested Mr. Futterman to have the Department forward a request to this effect.

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Returning to substantive matters, Senator Fulbright expressed skepticism about US activities on Taiwan being only of a defensive nature and asked the Ambassador, "What makes you think the US would not invade the mainland?" Senator Fulbright then switched to Vietnam, asking whether the Ambassador thought our actions there were defensive, and Senator Symington asked why, if Vietnam was so important, other countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Korea, did not help out. Ambassador McConaughy took the opportunity to comment that he agreed it would be helpful if other countries did more.

When Colonel Tweedy resumed his resume, an extensive discussion ensued about why the ROC had enlarged its own air fields to accommodate B-52's. The Senators refused to accept explanations from the Ambassador, the military witnesses, and Mr. Shoesmith that US officials had not been consulted in this matter, had not encouraged the Chinese, and were in fact unaware of the runway extension until intelligence reports to this effect came in hand. Senator Fulbright wanted to know why an effort was not made to ask the Chinese what they were up to, but Ambassador McConaughy noted that we did not intervene in everything the ROC did,

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especially when their own money was involved. Senator Symington asked whether Peking would not be inclined to regard a runway extension as an act of potential aggression. Mr. Shoemith said they would probably be apprehensive. Senator Symington commented, "maybe there are some people in State who look forward to a confrontation with the Red Chinese," but was assured by the witnesses they were unaware of any.

Colonel Tweedy noted that the Chinese Air Chief of Staff had asked General Holloway to land at one of the extended air bases, Hsinchu, but that he did not take up the invitation. An explanation of this matter was promised for the record.

Counsel and Senator Fulbright inquired into the use of military construction funds for the original work at CCK air base and were informed that the base was designed as a SAC recovery base. The morning session closed with extensive badgering of Ambassador McConaughy by Senator Fulbright, who refused to accept the Ambassador's responses to a barrage of questions about the need for bases, the nature of the threat, US interests in Southeast Asia, etc. He concluded that the Ambassador was "trifling with the Committee."

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The afternoon session was devoted principally to routine questions on the part of Counsel with Senators Symington and Fulbright closeted in conversation with Ambassador Stevenson for about fifty minutes of the one hour and forty minute session.

Asked whether the Chinese regarded US F-4's as an additional security guarantee, Ambassador McConaughy and Colonel Tweedy said they had not expressed their views one way or another. In answer to further questions, Ambassador McConaughy said there was no special understanding about the F-4's, and that he did not anticipate a major issue if they were withdrawn, even though the ROC approved of any manifestation of US presence. Other questions concerned negotiations leading to construction of CCK, financing of the construction, proposals for the use of Taiwan after Vietnam (answer: still at the staff-study stage); contract arrangements with Air Asia, (promised for the record); naval traffic in the Taiwan Strait; etc.

Counsel asked about General Ciccolella's advocacy of a "mobile strike force" for the ROC. Colonel Yokum said he was sure the General was referring to mobile defense, but

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that General Ciccolella would speak for himself when he appeared before the Committee. Colonel Yokum was asked whether the ROC had a different concept of the mission of its forces from our concept (answer: not to our knowledge); whether the mission of the special forces and airborne brigade could be regarded as the defense of Taiwan (Ambassador McConaughy--yes); and how many ROC boats were capable of an over-the-beach landing (answer: enough for about one division). Ambassador McConaughy said that he regarded the current Military Assistance Program as realistic, although the ROC could use a good deal more if the US had unlimited resources.

In response to Counsel's questions about US financing of propaganda efforts launched from the offshore islands, Ambassador McConaughy said USIA was not involved, but he would provide an answer for the record. Ambassador McConaughy said there was no US support of ROC propaganda efforts among the overseas Chinese. Referring to General Ciccolella's Rotary Club speech of February 27, in which he was reported to have criticized Americans who talked about accommodation with Communist China, Counsel asked whether the Ambassador had approved it. Ambassador McConaughy replied he understood

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the General intended only some informal luncheon remarks and therefore did not look upon it as a policy speech that would have required prior clearance. He did not make it a practice to censor informal remarks. However, had he known what the General was going to say, he would not have approved.

Upon his return from his meeting with Mr. Stevenson, Senator Symington adjourned the proceedings and asked the witnesses to return at eleven the following morning. He gave no indication of having reached any agreement in regard to testimony in controversial areas.

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